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Chapter Four

Beyond Syntax and Cities at War
Doing Rhetoric's History and Theory

Alloiostrophically
Mari Lee Mifsud

How does one make contact with difference when doing rhetoric's history
and theory? Rather than being afflicted with an anxiety that John Schilb once
termed heterophobia, what if doing the history and theory of rhetoric were
healthy about heteros? 1 Heteros means "difference" but visually the word
shows more than this, namely "eros" in "heteros"-love in difference.
In this chapter, I explore a love of difference in the history and theory of
rhetoric. Starting from my own love of Homer that I dare express, I tum to a
peculiar text about Homeric rhetoric, one not typically considered in the
rhetorical tradition, [Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer. 2 This
text is peculiar, at least in part, for its unabashed expressions of praise for the
genius of Homeric rhetoric. The scholarly attention this text has received has
identified it as different from that which belongs in the· history of ideas
proper, namely for what gets described as the spuriousness and hyperbole of
the text. Scholarship on this text has worked to settle the question of correct
authorship-deciding at one time it was Plutarch, then later, it was not-as
well as establishing the period and philosophy of the text. 3 The conclusion is
that most likely the text dates from the later years of the second century CE
as part of the pedagogy of the Roman imperial state. That is about as far as
scholarship has gotten, except that it went just a bit farther by reaching a
judgment on the quality of the text: hyperbolic, spurious, untrustworthy,
suspicious. "Plutarch's" notions are thought to be too outrageous in praise of
Homer's genius. The text gets described as having a "bizarre level" of exaggeration. 4 The "element of the outrageous" in the text typically is related to
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"Plutarch's" thesis that all human accomplishments can be traced to Homer,
and that Homer's was their greatest expression. 5 In particular, the author is
described as proceeding "by hook or by crook" to show the greatness of
Homer. 6 Attributing the discovery and/or formulation of the art of rhetoric to
Homer -despite that art having been associated with later thinkers and
culture-casts suspicion on the text. 7 The rhetorical quality of the text with
its tendency towards "eulogistic hyperbole" overwhelms the scholarly reception of the text to the effect of discrediting the ideas within. For reasons such
as these, the text is cast aside as "epistemologically suspect." 8
Indeed, the very idea of a Homeric rhetoric, let alone one characterized by
making contact with difference, is a strange one, which generates strong
responses of suspicion and dismissal. The Essay presents Homer's genius in
grandiose terms and takes the even bolder step of calling the Homeric epic a
rhetoric. This step lays the text bare to empirically studied approaches that
call into question the timeline of discovery at play here, i.e., who originated
. what when, and whether practices can exist conceptually prior to such inventions as a technical language, or in the absence of a concept of rational
order. 9
But abandonment of the idea of Homeric rhetoric on such technical
grounds as these seems unwise. Already, considerable arguments have been
made that we need not exaet Homer from the history and theory of rhetoric. Jo
I continue to rest on Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. 's sensibility that what matters is
our having the word "rhetoric" and using it as we see fit, not whether Homer
had the word "rhetoric." t t
When doing history and theory on a technical level that privileges empirical standards of correctness, one makes contact with difference by asking,
"How does difference measure up to the standard?" or "Is this thing that is
different worthy of authority according to the prevailing norms of authority?"
Of course, such questions do not encounter difference qua difference, only
ever difference qua norm.
To have a rhetorical approach to the study of ideas seems to offer so much
more than a technical approach. To have a rhetorical approach, in particular
to ideas about rhetoric, is to recognize the resourcefulness of rhetoric in
generating strategic swerves away from a unidirectional relation with difference that forces difference to abide by the norm. Such strategic swerves are
rhetorical through and through, and are enabled by a tropical view of the
possibilities of language usage.
Heinrich Lausberg characterizes all rhetorical tropes, figures, and
schemes as strategic swerves away from empirical standards of correctness
when measuring language usage, or (better yet) the whole of symbolic activity.12 Empirical standards of correctness are one thing but not the only thing
to consider in the whole of language usage and meaning making, including
history writing. 13 Expanding to a general economy of symbolicity, we see
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that even the empirical standards cannot escape what we know from Hayden
White that "discourse itself must establish the adequacy of the language used
in analyzing the field to the objects that appear to occupy it. And discourse
affects this adequation by a pre-figurative move that is more tropical than
logical." 14 Rhetoric's tropes, with their power to turn otherwise, make rhetoric rhetoric.
This turning otherwise exemplifies what Jane Sutton and I theorize as
alloiostrophic rhetoric. We see this rhetoric as tropical and transmutational,
departing from what once was a measure based solely on correctness to a
different measure, a different system, a different view, a different theory.
Whereas Lausberg is careful to point out that one who relies on correctness
as a measure can never go astray, he is also careful to point out that one who
goes astray with the tropes of discourse can do so to good ends and for good
purposes. 15 Moreover, Lausberg is careful to admit that the lines are blurred
and the boundaries fluid, so that even correctness becomes a trope, and can
therefore go astray.16 If correctness is a trope, it is one trope among many,
and we can choose otherwise, and do so to good ends. We can turn via
strophe to the other as a/loiosis.
I 'wish to explore how an alloiostrophic rhetorical approach to doing
history and theory structures the possibility of making contact with difference otherwise. When we take this turn otherwise, we can encounter differently in the pages of the Essay extensive and quite detailed attention to the
many rhetorical means by which language usage turns us otherwise. With an
alloiostrophic historiography, we can see that the Essay offers a vision of
Homeric rhetoric as offering playful and pleasant structures of differences
and turns otherwise in unexpected ways.
Time now to take an alloiostrophic turn in the history and theory of
rhetoric to interface with-rather than deny and negate-"Plutarch's" Homeric rhetoric. If a/loiostrophic rhetorical history and theory turns towards
difference, strangeness, the exceptional, the other, then the Essay seems the
perfect text to start. Turning to a text about rhetoric that is so strange as to be
nearly laughed out of the history of ideas and culture seems fitting, all the
more fitting when we realize that the Essay dedicates a large section to the
rhetorical figure of alloiosis, making the case that this figure of turning
otherwise characterizes Homeric rhetoric. Once the idea of Homeric rhetoric
has been figured otherwise, we can see more of how this idea offers new
insights into rhetoric's history and theory. In the third movement of this
chapter, I run with these insights through Aristophanes' Lysistrata. Lysistrata
embodies a/loiostrophic rhetoric, attuned to a love of difference and offering
many ways of turning otherwise for the sake of peace and loving solidarity.
Lysistrata's rhetoric circulates a Homeric rhetoric in its many turns toward
loving difference.
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II

As displayed in Table 4 .1, "Plutarch" offers a wide-ranging list of tropes and
figures of Homeric rhetoric. Each trope and figure gets typically one "chapter'' of explanation, usually the equivalent of a few sentences. Each chapter
has at least one example from the Homeric epics. "Plutarch" proceeds this
way with all the tropes and figures except for a few: "Metaphor" and "Combined Figures" get two chapters, "Pleonasm" gets seven chapters, 17 and
"Alloiosis" gets twenty-three chapters. Twenty-three chapters? What is this
figure of alloiosis that "Plutarch" attends to so fully in Homeric rhetoric?
And what significance does it have for the history and theory of rhetoric?
Alloiosis is presented by "Plutarch" as Homer's rhetorical means of escaping the ordinary, escaping the order of syntax. 18 A second term "Plutarch" associates with a/loiosis is asyntakton, or freedom from syntax. Such
freedom from syntax signifies change, difference, that which is other than the
_ ordinary, as well as pleasure: "Studied diction loves to escape the ordinary
and thus to become more energized (enargesteros) and vigorous (semnote-

Table 4.1.
B.16-71.

Adapted from [Plutarch} Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer,

Tropes

8.16.

Onomatopoeia

8.22.

Synecdoche

B.17

Epithets

8.23

Metonymy

8.18

Catachresis

8.24

Antonomasia

8.19-20

Metaphor

8.25

Antiphrasis

B.21

Metalepsis

8.26

Emphasis

8.28

Pleonasm

8.36

Ellipsis

8.29

Periphrasis

8.40

Asyndeton

8.30

Enallage

8.41-64

Alloiosis

8.31

Parembole

8.65

Proanaphonesis

Figures

8.32

Palillogy

8.66

Prosopopoeia

B.33

Epanaphora

8.67

Diatyposis

8.34

Epanodos

8.68

Irony

8.35

Homoeoteleuton

8.69

Sarcasm

8.35-37

Combined Figures

8.70

Allegory

8.38

Paronomasia

8.71

Hyperbole
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ros) and in general more pleasing." 19 Homeric rhetoric's vigor is pleasurably
energized by escaping the ordinruy.
"Plutarch" identifies the figure of alloiosis at work in Homeric rhetoric
"where the normal syntax is changed and varied for the sake of adding
kosmos and xaris to the discourse. The usual syntax appears not to follow,
but rather there is a change with regard to some peculiar characteristic." 20
Kosmos and xaris here are worth considering. The etymology of "kosmos"
suggests both order, as in the universal cosmos, and ornament, as in the
decorations of discourse. Whether the Greeks had a cosmically constitutive
view of style, or a stylistically constitutive view of the cosmos, I suggest now
only that kosmos can mean a stylistic order of things, and that this meaning
could carry over to "Plutarch's" considerations of the ends of alloiosis. The
ends of alloiosis are to give a discourse a stylistic order of things we can call
kosmos.
Xaris suggests grace, as when Athene bestows grace on Odysseus to
make him appear irresistible to the young maiden Nausicaa. 21 Homer describes xaris as the gift of grace from the gods, where the gods are akin to a
master craftsman who overlays gold on silver, having been taught by Hephaistos and Athene in the complete art. Grace is on every work the master
craftsman finishes. 22 When one is given this gift of grace from the gods, one
is said to have charisma (xarisma).
Xaris has a double meaning depending on whether a giver or receiver. On
the part of the giver, xaris suggests graciousness, kindness, goodwill towards
another. On the part of the receiver, xaris suggests the sense of favor felt,
thankfulness, gratitude. For example, when Aristotle describes the topoi of
the unwritten law, he does so in terms of the virtue of xaris, namely gratitude
for a benefactor and the like. 23 Because of this virtue, one can argue exception to the written law if the written law conflicts with the unwritten law of

xaris.
Both kosmos and xaris taken together in "Plutarch's" definition of
alloiosis suggest goodness in the form of grace and gratitude that can be
added to speech by way of the kind of stylistic change alloiosis offers. Let's
consider this change further. "Plutarch" tells us this change is of a peculiar
thing, perhaps even of a peculiar kind, and perhaps it is appropriate to call it
peculiar in general. "Peculiar'' here is translated from idion, the adjectival
form of idios. 24 Alloiosis turns towards the idios. To get at the significance of
focusing a rhetoric on a tum toward the idios, let's tum momentarily to the
classic analogy between medicine and rhetoric: rather than looking into that
which is common, whether in medicine by way of diseases and treatments in
common, or in rhetoric by way of civic problems and solutions in common,
alloiOsis turns towards that which is idios-peculiar and individual. This tum
is taken not for the purpose of substituting the common for the individual nor
the individual for the common. Rather, this tum is taken to make contact with
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the individual qua individual. From this contact, haptic insight emerges,
whether of the physical body or the body politic. Contemporary medicine has
already made this tum to the idios. 25 Homeric rhetoric in "Plutarch's" Essay
can take the political where medicine has already gone, toward the idios.
"Plutarch" continues to relate idios to al/oiosis in another way, too:
al/oiosis signifies idiosyncracy. As Keaney and Lamberton note, "idiosyncracy" here means something more than al!oiosis not being used elsewhere,
or predominantly, as a figure. Idiosyncracy here means as well that al/oiosis
is irregular. 26 "Plutarch" displays in a/loiosis the idiosyncratic perfonnances
of irregularities, shifts, changes, differences of gender, number, case, and
tense.
Of all these idiosyncratic ways of making sense, let's consider one example, alloiosis of gender. "Plutarch" identifies the changing genders of nouns a
frequent form of a/loiosis in Homeric rhetoric. Customary, he tells us, among
the ancients and people of Attica are changes from feminine to masculine to
convey a greater sense of strength and dynamism. 21
Thus, the fullest expression of alloiosis would be a change from masculine to feminine. Indeed, "Plutarch" tells us, "Occasional expressions
[idioteta] violate all the norms, however, both of dialect and of ancient custom: 'and he holds the lofty columns that keep earth and heaven apart. "'28
"Column" here (kion) changes the normative masculine "column" to feminine. "Plutarch" calls these "occasional expressions" idioteta, not just "occasional," but deriving from the idios, the individual, peculiar, strange, other,
exceptional. Homeric alloiosis violates existing rules rhetorically for the sake
of idios-a particular, individual, exceptional sense-rather than for the sake
of obeying rule-bound syntax held in common. Thus, this violation is more
of a liberation, something signified by the alpha-privative in asyntakton.
Liberated from syntax, the exceptional voice speaks its sense. Alloiosis
claims exception in its rhetorical perfonnances.
Though Homeric alloiosis is idiosyncratic in terminology and rhetorical
perfonnance, it is also pollakis (many) in its making. Throughout "Plutarch's" account of the operations of alloiosis, he suggests always that these
operations are pol/akis, meaning frequent, often, occurring many times. 29
Homeric rhetoric is the work of genius not only for its turns towards the
peculiar, but for the many times it turns towards the peculiar, and the many
ways in which it can tum toward the peculiar.
So we have in Homer not just many shifts in gender but many ways in
which gender shifts: apparent shifts of gender, and gender shifts concerning
sense: "Often the gender respects the sense and not the actual words."30
Combine these shifts with other shifts beyond gender-number, plural to
singular, case, degree, tense, voice, person, participles for verbs, shifts of
articles, shifts of prepositions, shifts of adverbs, shifts of conjunctions-and
we see so many shifts and so many ways shifts shift.

Beyond Syntax and Cities at War
Table 4.2.

71

Adapted from the Essay, 841-64.

841. Asyntakton or al/oiosis: types
842. Shifts of gender
843. Apparent shifts of gender
844. Gender from sense
845. Other shifts of gender
846. Shifts of number
847. Plural to singular
848. Shifts of case
849. Effective use in openings
850. Genitive to nominative
851. Archaic shifts of number
852. e.g., dual to singular
853. Shifts of degree; shifts of verb forms
854 .•Shifts of tense
855. Shifts of voice
856. Shifts of number
857. Shifts of person; apostrophe
858. Participles substituted for verbs
859. Shifts of articles
860. Prepositions: one used for another
861. Wrong case after preposition
862. Omission of prepositions
863. Shifts of adverbs
864. Shifts of conjunctions

So we can see in the Essay a Homeric rhetoric, that is alloiostrophic,
hence idioteta and pollakis as it .shifts in many ways to go along (enallassei
pollakis). What does "shifts" mean? The Essay mostly reveals terms for
"shifts" in the semantic range of exallage, meaning complete change, alteration, withdrawal, removal, being in excess of the limit, turning another way,
diverting, amusing, alienating. 3! "Plutarch's" alloiostrophic Homeric rhetoric shows the generative power of always making yet another way, a way
derived by the radical other, the incongruous, individual, and idiotic (being
understood in the general economy of the individual, the idios). So characterized by the figure of alloiosis, Homeric rhetoric offers another way, a/Ion de
tropon, or a different way, heteron de tropon.32 To be other (alias) is to be
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different (heteros). Homeric rhetoric is characterized by turning away from
the common order of syntax to the pleasure, goodness, and grace of both
otherness and difference.

III
When seeing rhetoric's history and theory alloiostrophically and in terms of
its Homeric character, we can see Lysistrata, as Aristophanes tells her story.
We can see Lysistrata's rhetorical redemption of the polis by way of alloiotic
gendered performances of gift giving. This redemption is transmutative,
changing war to peace, misogyny to equality, and enmity to solidarity, ending in lots oflove and dancing.
I start with a landmark passage, in which Lysistrata tells the magistrates
how women would clean up the polis:
Imagine the polis as a fleece just shorn. First, put it in a bath and wash out all
the sheep dung; spread it on a bed and beat out the riff-raff with a stick, and
pluck away the parasites, those who clump and knot themselves together to
snag government positions, card them out and pluck off their heads. Next, card
the wool into a sewing basket of unity and goodwill, mixing in everyone. The
resident aliens and any other foreigner who's your friend, and anyone who
owes money to the people's treasury, mix them in there too. And oh yes, the
cities that are colonies of this land: imagine them as flocks of your fleece, each
one lying apart from the others. So take all these flocks and bring them together here, joining them all and making one big bobbin. And from this weave a
fine new cloak for the people. 33

A home/polis relation flashes. The image of women weaving in the home
appears alongside the image of ruling the polis. The interpretive nonn in
rhetoric's history and theory is to consider these spheres not only separate, as
in the polis being the public sphere, the home the private, but also in order, as
in the polis being an achievement in the ruling order beyond the structure of
the home. But Lysistrata turns attention to the home. Hospitality rituals of the
home, like creating solidarity and goodwill through gift giving, appear alongside the image of a parasite-filled polis.
Scholarship on the home/polis relation overidentifies metaphor as the
governing trope in this relation, and it says nothing of the gift, which is at the
heart of the matter. 34 The end of weaving is the gift of a finely woven robe.
Human relations orchestrated by gift giving are distinct, peculiar, different
from the ruling order of the polis in orchestrating relations. This distinction-the peculiar otherness of the gift in relation to the state-is worth
considering further. Always with an eye on the rhetorical dynamics at play,
let's explore the figure of metonym, different from metaphor, and the topos
of the gift, different from that of the polis, as alloiostrophic rhetorics. These
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al/oiostrophic rhetorics generate persuasive appeals otherwise, which are
themselves constituted otherwise by ideals and practices of gift giving, and in
tum constitute social relations otherwise.
I choose to interpret the juxtaposition of home/polis as less metaphoric
than metonymic. Metaphor is too much our norm. As Hayden White states in
his critique of the tropics of discourse, metaphor forges meaning by rendering the different familiar by inserting all that is familiar into all that is
different. If metaphor were our primary trope determining the meaning of the
home/polis relation, the polis could co-opt the home, laying claim to the
concept and practices associated, touting its own practices as if they were the
virtuous practices of the home. As a metaphor for the polis, the home could
be rendered familiar through the already familiar polis, annihilating the distinction of home, along with its potential to give something other to the
operations of the polis. Let's examine this a bit further.
The polis is already familiar. 35 In the history and theory of rhetoric, for
example, how the polis rules through speech is studied, along with how the
polis forges cultural identity and norms through civic discourse and vice
versa, how it argues and decides about the administration of the state, and
how· it ensures or fails to ensure justice and the good through its art of
practical judgment. With the polis, rhetoric is already familiar. The word
''polis" then, marks the privileged term in a home/polis binary, and what is
already familiar in rhetorical studies.
If the home/polis relation were to be metaphoric, then the already familiar
polis would be served and affirmed. For example, the polis could describe its
rule in terms of hospitality. Indeed, wars get described through home and
hospitality metaphors: the United States calls for war on account of the
"homeland" having been attacked, and for such an inhospitable act, war is
justified, along with a new paradigm of the militarized democratic state
policed by "Homeland Security." I do not feel the hospitality of home at the
airport as I am scanned and patted. 36 Or consider the argument made by U.S.
leaders prior to the invasion of Iraq, that the U.S. would be greeted as liberators when they entered the homes of people oppressed by a tyrannical state,
again warranting war. 37 That the United States entered the homes of Iraqi
citizens with a "shock and awe;, theatre of bombs does not seem an act of
hospitality fitting of home culture. The home/polis metaphor can render persuasive in the name of hospitality those practices of the polis that are quite
inhospitable.
From a different perspective, but with the same understanding of the
interpretive constraints of metaphor, if the home/polis relation were inverted
(as a potential interpretation of what Aristophanes is up to), then weaving
would replace ruling as the privileged practice, and the home would replace
the polis as the privileged term. Such an inversion is not without its own set
of problems, because metaphor is still ruling the meaning making. When
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metaphor rules, the distinction of the compared term comes to be in the
service of the privileged term. If "home" were to be read via inversion of the
privileged term, rather than the traditionally privileged "polis," then the distinction of the polis would be lost for the privilege of the home. Privileging
the home, however, has its own set of problems. Lysistrata calls for a unified
people typical of a home but not a polis. Contemporary scholarship points
out the shortcomings of such homogeneity in the orchestration of human
relations: it is oppressive and antidemocratic in its demands for everybody to
be the same. Moreover, change, including the correction of mistakes, becomes difficult in such a closed system.
No matter how we read the home/polis metaphor, either the home or the
polis must die, or rather must have its difference and distinction assimilated
by the privileged term and concept. Moreover, in both interpretations we are
left with a failed view of Aristophanes. As Lisa Pace Vetter argues, Aristophanes' vision of weaving as ruling voiced by Lysistrata's metaphor is problematic because it creates an oppressive structure for human relations
through an overidentified unification of all people, classes, races, and cultures. She describes Aristophanes' play as a kind of failed vision of human
and political relations, and she uses this failure as a way of turning towards
Plato to show us how to succeed. 38
I would rather call metaphor a failure than Aristophanes. We have more
tropes than just metaphor to figure meaning making, to bring to the interpretative table, to give texts their most generous reading, so that we resist falling
into that ever-present teleological trap that anything prior to the achievements of Plato and Aristotle is in some way a rudimentary or failed version
of what Plato and Aristotle would succeed in creating.
Although the polis could be served by co-opting the home as its governing metaphor, or the home could be served in an inverted system, Lysistrata
seems to be doing something quite different. Lysistrata works to intervene in
the operations of the polis because these operations have eventuated in war
without end Her primary means of intervention is metonymic. Whereas
Hayden White believes metonymy to be a subset of metaphor, metonymy can
make meaning otherwise. 39 Metaphor signifies relations through similarity
whereas metonymy signifies relations through contiguity. 40 Hence, metaphor
produces assimilation, rendering two distinct phenomena the same, whereas
metonymy produces association, juxtaposing two phenomena and rendering
them distinct. The movement from metaphor to metonymy and the movement of metonymy itself is alloiostrophic. This alloiostrophic turn away
from the self-same signification via metaphor and dialectical resolution is a
way of signifying otherwise.
When Lysistrata's passage is seen within a tropical frame of metonymy
and a figural frame of al/oiostrophe, new things emerge. We can see the
juxtaposition of the home as a distinct, peaceable space of living and ruling,
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structured through the norms of hospitality and gift giving. The image of
women's work with wool flashes alongside the polis, neither wool working
nor polis working lose distinction in the other, the rub between giving rise to
something new, an imagination of the gift orchestrating the polis. When
these images are interpreted as metonymic, their juxtaposition offers something different to the polis: not an affirmation that the polis already is a kind
of hospitable home, nor a conspiracy to replace the polis with the home.
Lysistrata's mission is to save the polis and the home and so forge a sense of
solidarity between the two; she is, after all, the theatrical version of the real
Lysimaches, the priestess of the Athena Polias, who oversaw the protection
of the Athenian polis. 41
As noted above, metaphor shapes difference in the form of the self-same,
whereas metonym shapes a juxtaposition of differences, complicating a simple self/other binary. Weaving does not replace ruling, rather flashes beside
ruling a different set of practices and perspectives, orientations and ethics.
Thus, weaving stands by the side of ruling. The two are so different from
each other that there is something incommensurable about their difference,
seemingly impossible to exchange, but something new is created in the contact, 'the rub, the haptic relation between the two. Interpreting this scene
through metonym, we can see these two-the home and the polis-existing
side-by-side in a paratactic aggregation of symbolic action orchestrating human relations. 42 Their interaction is generative of new possibilities.
To explore these new possibilities, let's start with metonym's turn from
the polis to the home. Metonym turns attention to an interpretive resource
residing within the home, and in the home we find the gift.
In the Homeric epics, where no division between the home and the polis
really makes sense, the Homeric home supports, enacts, and governs spaces
for the performances of both private and public life. Hospitality orchestrates
the Homeric home and acts as the quintessential performance of gift giving.
The epics offer a multitude of gift-exchange rituals, including the speechmaking therein, designed to secure and navigate relations. Whereas the gifts
are exchanged between individuals and families, their perfonnances typically
make visible a public assembly suggestive of the home as an aggregation of
private and public life, structured through the first principle of hospitality.
Take, for example, the scene of Odysseus' arrival and stay at the palace of
Alkinoos. Each detail of the scene brings forth a vision of Homeric hospitality: welcoming a stranger with guest gifts, offering to him a feast, presenting
an occasion for speechmaking and storytelling to a large audience of men,
preparing a splendid departure with more guest-gifts, another feast, and still
more occasions for the exchange of speeches. Whereas action generally
passes quickly in Homer, the story of Alkinoos' hospitality and guest-friendship that is offered to Odysseus spreads across six chapters, a remarkable
dedication to the details and dynamics of hospitality. 43
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Other less extensive scenes confirm the Homeric home's first principle
being hospitality, such as when Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, is welcomed by his swineherd Eumaios; 44 or when Telemachus is received as a
stranger by both Nestor and Menelaus; 45 or when Athena, disguised as the
stranger Mentes, appears at the door of Odysseus' palace, and is welcomed
into the home by Telemachus. 46 Each of these scenes shares the theme of
strangers to the home being welcomed into the home, and welcomed in style.
Telemachus is not just greeted at the shores of Pylos, he is celebrated with a
feast, even as a stranger, before King Nestor even recognizes him as Odysseus' son. Scenes such as these create a vision of hospitality as the first
principle of the home, and the home as the first principle of human solidarity.
Even scenes where hospitality goes awry demonstrate the power of hospitality rituals in Homeric culture. The Trojan Horse, given by the Achaeans to
the Trojans in the guise of a guest-gift, initiates a deeply embedded performance of hospitality, namely, acceptance of a gift being given, even if from a
wartime enemy. How else could the Trojans have been so duped if not for the
cultural obligation to perform a hospitality ritual? Receiving a guest-gift in
appropriate fashion and showing solidarity in gift exchange mirrors the act of
giving a guest-gift and showing solidarity in the giving.
If we look otherwise at these scenes of hospitality we can see the flip side
of the gift, where the gift is simultaneously poison and remedy, hospitality
and hostility. Of course, it is hard to feel sorry for Telemachus or Odysseus
when they are "held hostage" by their "captors" and are forced to be pampered and pleased daily for days and weeks on end. But Homer gives us more
literal scenes of "hostile hospitality" with the hostage taking host of Odysseus and his men, the cyclops Polyphemus. 47 Regardless of the degree of the
hospitality or type,· hospitality requires a host, who is the most powerful
figure in the system of gift exchange. So establishes the power structure: the
host has enough power to be a captor.
Perhaps the separation of home and polis that the arrival of democracy
brought about also caused the genuineness of the hospitality of the Homeric
home to atrophy in the ancient Greek political imagination. Perhaps, too,
Lysistrata's metonym of weaving, eventuating in a gift to the polis of a finely
woven robe, brings back the strength of the gift to forge solidarity-a solidarity that acts as a captor, preventing war and enslaving people in peace.
The parasite is a metonymy of the gift. Again imagine the polis as a fleece
just shorn: full of shit and parasites, metonymically speaking, men who
clump and knot themselves together to snag power, men like the magistrate
and his accompanying old men who have come to arrest Lysistrata. The
image of the gift of a robe finely woven flashes next to the image of a
parasitic polis. These parasites are the old men of the chorus who are "rank
and file veterans of the democracy's wars against tyrants and barbarians, but
now live on state pay." 48 Athens is their host, and as parasites these men
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drain her wealth with their unrelenting support of war driven by their desire
for profits, despite unending war being at the expense of the people and the
peaceable prosperity of panhellenic solidarity. The parasite cares nothing for
solidarity in its attachment to its host; it cares only to be hosted.
The parasite marks the gift gone wrong. Something given but not replenished with at least mutual, if not escalating, generosity will die, as will the
parasite. When a system of exchange is parasitic, everything dies: the host,
the parasite, and the gift. The desire of the parasite is such that no energy is
left for recirculation of the goods of the host. Nothing compels the parasite to
expend its excess, to keep the goods of the host in circulation. The parasitic
system cannot sustain itself. Death comes from the gift gone wrong.
But Lysistrata is a comedy, not a tragedy. The gift shall not die. Rather
we shall cleanse the fleece of parasites, beating them out with a stick and
plucking away their heads. The death of the parasite, in Burkean terms,
allows for the comic redemption of the polis.
Yet, being alloiostrophic, we can see in this description still something
other, yet another way, perhaps what Michel Serres sees in his philosophical
study of the parasite, namely, that the parasite is essential and inescapable to
the functioning of the system and can be cleansed only inevitably to return.
The parasite is a necessary part of the system because, as Serres puts it,
"systems work because they do not work. Nonfunctioning remains essential
to functioning." 49 The parasite as such is the source of new patterns. Precisely because the magistrates and warmongers are parasites and irritants to the
whole body politic, Lysistrata and her panhellenic band of women rise up to
reassert the lost image of the peaceable home, the women's work of weaving
therein, and the gift of giving, in an economy of exchange that somehow
finds a way out of war. The parasite is a necessary and ever-present part of
the system. Just as each year brings a season for shearing fleece, we know the
cycle will continue, and always parasites will return, irritating the system so
as to warrant fleecing. Women don't just weave from one fleece forever.
These images flash perpetually. We must never become complacent in our
alloiostrophic action.
Metonymic interpretations of the gift and the parasite help us see not just
new insights into this passage on weaving and ruling, but the larger context
of Lysistrata's story. The sex strike can be seen as something more than just
an entertaining use of sex to titillate and entertain an audience. As Bataille
writes, "it should come as no surprise to us that the principle of the gift,
which propels the movement of general activity, is at the basis of sexual
activity." 50
Once turned otherwise to interface with these dynamics of the gift, still
other dynamics of the gift emerge. Lysistrata's appeal to the magistrates is
partly a reproach for the lack of grateful reciprocity performed by these
warring states: each state owes the other. Sparta was rescued by Athens when
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an earthquake ravaged the state, and Athens was freed from tyranny with
Sparta's support. Lysistrata concludes, "considering all these mutual benefactions, why prosecute the war and make more trouble? Why not make
peace? What keeps you still apart?"5 1 The string of appeals in the text is
worth highlighting for the details of this topos of mutual reciprocity:
Don't you remember when Pericleidas the Spartan came here once and sat at
the altars as a suppliant of the Athenians, pale in his scarlet unifo1n1, begging
for troops? That time when Messenia was up in a1n1s against you and the god
was shaking you with an earthquake? And Cimon went with four thousand
infantrymen and rescued all Sparta? After being treated that way by the Athenians, you're now out to ravage the country that's treated you weIJ?S2
Do you think I'm going to let you Athenians off? Don't you remember how
the Spartans in tum, when you were dressed in slaves' rags, came with their
spears and wiped out many Thessalian fighters, many friends and allies of
Hippias? That day when they were the only ones helping you to drive him out?
And how they liberated you, and replaced your slaves' rags with a wa1n1 cloak,
as suits a free people?53
So why, after so many fine favors done, are you fighting instead of calling a
halt to your misbehavior? Why not make peace? Come on, what's in the
way? 54

Lysistrata's appeals to a gift-culture ethic of reciprocity and mutual benefaction flash alongside the warring relations of the polis. The difference and
distinction of the home and its resources for relating become all the more
prominent when we consider that from the start of her story, Lysistrata defends her activism by way of an appeal to protecting her home. She would
rather be home, sitting modestly, bothering no one, stirring not a single blade
of grass, but if someone annoys her and rifles her nest, they'll find a wasp
inside. ss Lysistrata speaks her love of home, a love characterized by stillness
and nonviolence, a love worth defending, even if with violence (albeit slight
violence, as the women only beat on the men for a minute, and the rest of
their strategy does not involve physical harm, unless one considers the creation of sexual desperation a kind of physical harm).
Appeals to mutual benefaction, even competitive generosity-figured
through a home/polis metonymy-succeed. A party ensues, with feasting,
friendship, lovemaking, and much dancing. The story closes when the Spartan ambassador says, after the Athenian ambassador calls for a dance, that
this story will be carried as far as "where the heavenly dancers leap and
shout . . . beat your feet throughout the land, help the dancers make some
noise, sing a song of joyous praise ... !"56
The home is a poetic gift to the rhetoric of the polis. It offers a poetic
praxis of competitive generosity and reciprocity that is characteristic of poet-
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ic gift culture, prior to the fonnalization of the state apparatus called the
polis. Just as Homer put forward the principal rituals of the pre-polis world as
those that reinforce competitively generous inter-familial reciprocity (e.g.,
supplication, guest-friendship, guest-gifts), so too Lysistrata appeals to the
principal rituals of polis culture as those that would reinforce competitively
generous interstate reciprocity (e.g., rituals of mutual benefaction), rather
than generously competitive interstate war (e.g., rituals of mutual destruction).
Perhaps Burke had Lysistrata in mind when he theorized that comedic
redemption lies in its hopefulness. As he writes at the end of his introduction
to Attitudes Toward History, "basically this book would accept the Aristophanic assumptions, which equate tragedy with war and comedy with
peace." 57 Comedy has a way of redeeming the hopefulness of human relations, so that we might recognize another not as an evil enemy but as a
mistaken friend. The legacy of the poetic gift culture as we see it in the
metonymy of home/polis and in Lysistrata's arguments of mutual benefaction is itself a gift to the polis, offering the polis comedic redemption.
IV
The contributions that arise from exploring alloiostrophic rhetoric in/as Homeric rhetoric via "Plutarch" and Lysistrata appear as an idiosyncratic rhetorical style of making many ways to go along. Always with another trope, we
go along. Does this suggest we are amenable to going along with whatever is
put before us? No. We have more wise ends than these. "Plutarch" tells
another story, one he says Aristotle used to tell. 58 When Homer was just a
baby, the leaders of his city, under pressure from a war, announced they were
leaving, and invited anyone to come with them who wished to go along. A
baby called Melesignes expressed his wish to go along and from that day
forward he was called Homer: Homerein, to go along. 59 In a Homeric rhetoric, "to go along" is to find another trope, to make a new way, beyond syntax
and cities at war.
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